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This paper analyzes the existing relationship between ethnic fractional-
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neous or very fragmented countries, but low where fractionalization
is intermediate. In fact, when ethnic diversity is intermediate, con-
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1 Introduction
Much research has been directed at explaining the causes and the
consequences of corruption. Different levels of corruption have been
attributed to differences in religious tradition, colonial experiences (see e.g.
Treisman, 2000), level of development (see e.g. Blackburn et al., 2010), levels
of decentralization (Treisman, 2000, Fisman and Gatti, 2002 and Lessmann
and Markwardt, 2010), competition among bureaucracies (see e.g. Drugov,
2010) or to the availability of natural resources (see e.g. Vicente, 2010
and Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). Researchers have also investigated
the effects of corruption on investment and growth (see e.g Mauro, 1995),
on international trade (see e.g. Lambsdorff, 1998 and Musila and Sigue`,
2010), on income inequality (see e.g. Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2010),
on the volatility of the economic growth rate (see Evrensel, 2010) and on
misallocation of resources (see e.g. Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998 and 2000).
Our paper tries to provide additional light on the causes and consequences
of corruption by suggesting that a further determinant of it, ethnic diversity,
can produce a novel and non-linear impact on output growth.
In recent years, the economic interest in ethnic fractionalization1 has
increased, in part due to greater cross-border movements. Although
ethnic diversity is an omnipresent theme throughout history, economists
are only recently starting to pay attention to it. Journalists report on
ethnic diversity mostly when it erupts into bloodshed, although ethnic
fractionalization does not automatically, nor exclusively, imply ethnic
conflict. The recent literature has claimed that cross-country differences
in ethnic diversity explain a substantial part of cross-country differences in
public policies, political instability and other economic factors associated
with long-run growth (see Easterly and Levine 1997). Political economy
models suggest that polarized societies will be both prone to competitive
rent-seeking by different groups and have difficulty agreeing on public
goods like infrastructure, education and good policies (Alesina and Drazen
1991; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Alesina and Spoloare 1997). Alesina and
Drazen (1991) describe how a war of attrition between interest groups can
postpone macroeconomic stabilization. Alesina et al. (1999) present a
1In our paper we will consider as ethnic group one of human beings whose members
identify with each other usually on the basis of common cultural, linguistic, religious,
behavioral or biological traits. In this respect, we will use interchangeably term ethnic
fractionalization or ethnolinguistic fractionalization since in the definition of the concept of
“ethnic group” it is difficult to distinguish between ethnic and linguistic variables. In fact,
language is a fundamental part of the criterion used by ethnologists and anthropologists to
define the concept of ethnicity. Indeed, Alesina et al. (2003) compute a measure of ethnic
fractionalization, “ethnicity”, the definition of which involves a combination of racial and
linguistic characteristics. Also, Atlas Norodov Mira (1964), in order to compute the ELF
index, mainly used language to define groups, even if it sometimes refers to notions of race
or national origin in order to distinguish between different groups.
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model linking heterogeneity of preferences across ethnic groups in a city
to the amount and type of public goods the city supplies. Results show that
the shares of spending on productive public goods are inversely related to
the city ethnic fragmentation. Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1999) and
Alesina et al. (2003)2, amongst others, show that ethnic fractionalization
is negatively correlated with measures of infrastructure quality, literacy and
school attainment.
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization appears to be responsible for a variety
of corruption-related phenomena (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Svensson 2000).
Svensson (2000) and Mauro (1995) find that corruption is higher the higher
ethnic diversity. Svensson (2000) also finds that corruption increases where
there is more foreign aid in an ethnically-divided society although this is not
the case in an ethnically-homogeneous one. In Shleifer and Vishny (1993)
corruption may be particularly damaging when there is more than one bribe-
taker. If each independent bribe-taker does not internalize the effects of
her/his bribes on the other bribe-takers’ revenues, then the result is more
bribes per unit of output and less output. Ethnically-diverse societies may
be more likely to yield independent bribe-takers, since each ethnic group
is responsible for a region or ministry in the power structure. For this
reason Mauro (1995) regresses growth on corruption assuming an index
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an instrumental variable to test the
hypothesis that more fractionalization (and therefore more corruption) is
associated with lower economic growth3.
The literature has thus stressed the negative role of ethnic fragmentation on
corruption and therefore on economic growth. But alongside this negative
role, there is the possibility of a positive role for ethnic diversity. In fact as
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) say:
“ Is ethnic diversity “good” or “bad” from an economic point of view,
and why? Its potential costs are fairly evident. Conflict of preferences,
racism, prejudices often lead to policies which are suboptimal from the point
of view of society as a whole, and to the oppression of minorities which
can explode in war or least in disruptive political instability. But an ethnic
mix also brings about variety in abilities, experiences, cultures which may be
productive and may lead to innovation and creativity. The United States are
the quintessential example of these two faces of racial relations in a “melting
pot”. ”
Analogously to T˚angeras and Lagerlo¨f (2009), the role of the degree of
2These results are very strong in regressions without income per capita (which may be
endogenous to ethnic fractionalization). They lose some of their significance when on the
right-hand side one controls for GDP per capita.
3“Sociological factors may contribute to rent-seeking behavior. An index of
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (societal divisions along ethnic and linguistic lines) has
been found to be correlated with corruption. Also, public officials are more likely to do
favors for their relatives in societies where family ties are strong”. Mauro (1997)
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ethnic diversity of a country (i.e. the number of ethnic groups) has been
explored to describe and explain an economic phenomenon. While T˚angeras
and Lagerlo¨f’s analysis is related to the probability of the occurrence of a
civil war, we discuss the level of corruption of a country and its relationship
to ethnic fragmentation. In particular, we contribute to this debate by
analyzing how ethnolinguistic fractionalization can influence the extent of
corruption.
We propose a descriptive model since, as Collier (2001) and Alesina et al.
(2003) emphasize, it is hard to see any policy implications arising from
fractionalization, because there is little that a country can legitimately do
about its ethnic composition without affecting other non-economic variables
which are not the object of this study.
Indeed, our descriptive paper does not aim at suggesting optimal ethnic
policies directed at reducing corruption or at allowing growth to increase.
One might note however that, for a given ethnolinguistic fractionalization, a
policy aspiring to achieve a fair and balanced representation of ethnic groups
within the administrative public sector machine (even in the presence of
constituencies with a majority of votes) could help not only in reinforcing
mutual understanding and muting fake stereotypes but also in making the
fight against corruption more credible. Minority rights in this respect could
prove helpful.
In our model, we rely on a society populated by bureaucrats, controllers and
entrepreneurs, producing a single good. The population is fractionalized in
n different ethnic groups. A theoretical game is constructed as follows:
the entrepreneur has to choose between the traditional technology and the
modern technology. We assume that the modern technology has higher
productivity than the traditional technology. In order to access to the
modern technology, the entrepreneur has to request a concession from the
bureaucrat. Since the concession has an expiration date, the entrepreneur
needs to submit the project to the Public Administration in each period,
and each concession submission is independent from the previous ones. To
capture these characteristics of the problem, we develop a one-shot game.
We also assume that the entrepreneur must acquire a bureaucrats approval
for the project (see Yoo, 2008). The bureaucrat can ask the entrepreneur
for a bribe in exchange for providing the concession. The entrepreneur can
agree or refuse to pay the bribe. Moreover, we consider the presence of
monitoring activity. Monitoring activity is related to the intervention of the
controllers in order to penalize illegal interactions between entrepreneurs
and bureaucrats.
In our work, the optimal monitoring level is endogeneously derived. We
assume that ethnic fractionalization has two opposite effects: on the one
hand, it increases the cost of monitoring but, on the other hand, high ethnic
fractionalization generates an increase in the probability of being reported,
because the controller reports the corrupt transaction only if the bureaucrat
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belongs to a different ethnic group from that of the controller. Indeed,
for certain levels of ethnic diversity, fragmentation takes on a positive role
in controlling corruption because it increases the level of control between
different ethnic groups.
The findings of the present paper are comparable to the ones in T˚angeras
and Lagerlo¨f (2009): indeed, in both cases, the influence of the degree of
ethnic diversity seems to be more powerful when the country is neither
homogeneous nor highly fragmented. The common root of these results can
be found in the presence of two competitive effects due to the number of
ethnic groups. In particular, in our paper, the effect of monitoring corruption
is low either in homogeneous or very fragmented countries, while it is high
when the level of ethnic diversity is intermediate.
In this context, we also find a non-linear relationship between ethnic
diversity, corruption and growth: in fact, homogeneous and fragmented
societies are characterized by high corruption and low economic growth.
In the middle range of ethnic diversity, the ethnic factor acts as a “control”
on corruption thus producing greater economic growth.
In Figures 1a, 1b, 1c, we scatter the growth rate in 2007 against the
measure of ethnic fractionalization proposed in Alesina et al. (2003) for
World Countries, Democratic Countries and OECD Countries, respectively4.
As the Figures indicate, intermediately fractionalized countries have the
highest growth rate. The Figures also show the implementation of a formal
regression between the ethnic fractionalization index and the growth rate via
quadratic polynomial function. There is evidence that a reversed U-shaped
function seems to fit the scatter plot well5.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
the model and the related theoretical game. In section 3, the relationship
between the monitoring level, corruption and economic growth is studied.
In section 4, using the results of the previous sections, we endogeneize
the monitoring level of controllers and prove that a non-linear relationship
between fractionalization -via corruption- and growth exists. Section 5
concludes.
4See Appendix A for the list of the countries.
5The R-squared are 0.03327, 0.07805 and 0.1309 for World, Democratic and OECD
Countries, respectively. The second-order best fit polynomial is P (x) = −14.86x2 +
11.96x+2.627, P (x) = −21.3x2+16.81x+1.675 and P (x) = −0.102x2+0.9078x+2.511
for World, Democratic and OECD Countries, respectively. We point out that the analysis
developed in our model does not aim at providing forecasts, but only at stating the
relationship between variables. In particular, the relationship between growth rate and
fractionalization is under scrutiny in our paper. In this situation, standard statistics
arguments guarantee that the fit parameters such as R-squared are less relevant, because
no one would expect fractionalization to explain a high percentage of the growth rate, as
the growth rate of a country is affected by many other factors. The best fit parameters, as
expected, improve when restricting from World Countries to Democratic Countries, and
then to OECD Countries.
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Figure 1: The scatter plot is the growth rate versus the ethnic coefficient.
The line is the best fit quadratic function.
2 The theoretical game model
Let us consider an economy producing a single homogeneous good and
composed of a continuum of 3 types of agents: bureaucrats, controllers and
entrepreneurs. The controllers monitor bureaucrats’ behavior in order to
weed out or reduce corruption. Firms manufacture a homogeneous product
y using either one of two technologies6 with constant return to scale: the
modern technology and the traditional technology. Each entrepreneur is
assumed to have the same quantity of capital k. The product may either be
manufactured for consumption purposes or for investment purposes.
The modern technology output is:
y = aMk (1)
Here we deal with the grant of a concession7 to the entrepreneurs. In order
to obtain their concession, the entrepreneurs need to submit a project to
the Public Administration.
The entrepreneur may access the traditional technology without any
concession being issued by the Public Administration. In this case the
output is:
y = aTk (2)
From here on, it will be assumed that aM > aT and therefore that the
modern technology is more profitable than the traditional technology.
6As in Li et al. (2000) an agent can produce in either the traditional or the modern
technology. Productivity of the modern technology is greater than that of the traditional
technology. The advantage of the traditional technology is that it is not subject to
expropriation, while that of the modern technology is. The rationale is that entrepreneurs
with the modern technology must obtain permits and concessions and are vulnerable to
the effects of corruption. This hypothesis could be interpreted by regarding the modern
technology as an innovative technology (e.g. telecommunications) which is still in need of
State regulation.
7The concession, once granted, has an expiration date and must be renewed at the
end of its lifetime. As we will see, we construct and develop a one-shot game, and so the
one-period concession seems to be suitable for modelling purposes. After the expiration
date, the game is repeated in an identical manner.
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The bureaucrat receives a salary w8. In this model, the bureaucrat may
decide to issue a concession only in exchange for a bribe. Since the gross
profit resulting from the investment in the modern technology is higher
than the one in the traditional technology, the entrepreneur may find it
worthwhile to negotiate and accept the bribe requested by the corrupt
bureaucrat in order to obtain the necessary concession to access the modern
technology. The bureaucrat may decide not to ask for a bribe and to issue
the concession to all those who submit a project, or s/he may decide to
ask for a bribe in exchange for such a concession. The State monitors
bureaucrats -via controllers- in such a way that qi is the probability that the
bureaucrat belonging to the i-th ethnic group is reported9. In our model,
we assume that the bureaucrat detected in a corrupt transaction will be
punished with a finemk10. In contrast, the loss of reputation incurred by the
entrepreneur detected in a corrupt transaction may affect her/his business.
More precisely, it is common knowledge11 that the j-th entrepreneur incurs
a specific value cjk to the loss of reputation derived from being caught in a
corrupt transaction12 where cj ∈ [0, 1].
The controller must monitor the bureaucrat’s behavior and s/he puts a level
of monitoring p in place. Since the pioneer work of Allport (1954) on the
theory of prejudice and following the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and
Turner, 1986), early work established that patterns of intergroup behavior
can be understood considering that individuals may attribute positive utility
to the well-being of members of their own group and negative utility to that
of members of others group (see e.g. Tajfel et al. 1971). The simple fact of
belonging to a group can lay foundations of prejudice, judgmental biases and
8It is assumed that no arbitrage is possible between the public and the private sector
and that therefore there is no possibility of the bureaucrats becoming entrepreneurs, even
if their salary w were lower than the entrepreneur’s net return. This happens because the
bureaucrat individuals in the population have no access to the capital markets, but only
a job, and therefore may not become entrepreneurs.
9In our model, there is an implicit public budget constraint so that the State uses
revenues which derive from a lump sum taxation and fines imposed on bureaucrats caught
in corrupt transaction, to pay the wages and to put in place redistributive policies.
However, there is no space for financing public productive expenditure. Since this is
not the focus of our work, we do not make that public constraint explicit.
10The punishment for the detected bureaucrat is not a constant, but following Rose-
Ackerman (1999), it is a function of the bureaucrat’s payoff. In fact, in the suggested
model, since the obtained bribe is a function of k, the punishment is assumed to be a
function of k.
11The entrepreneurs experience different reputation costs when they are detected in
corrupt transactions. The differences derive from the economic relevance of entrepreneurial
activity. Hence, it is possible to attach a specific value to the entrepreneurs’ reputation
costs, and such values belong to the bureaucrats’ information set.
12Based on the statements of Rose-Ackerman (1999), the punishment for the
entrepreneur is not a constant, but rather a function of the entrepreneur’s payoff. The
punishment for the entrepreneur is considered as a function of the investment determining
the size of the profits.
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intergroup discrimination towards outgroups13. Following this literature, we
assume that only if the controller meets a corrupt bureaucrat belonging to
a different ethnic group will s/he report the corruption14. We hypothesize
that “The Department of Controllers” is divided in proportion to ethnic
groups15. Let ωi ∈ [0, 1] the probability that an individual belongs to the
i-th ethnic group, with i = 1, . . . n.16 Following Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005), we rely on a country where the different ethnic groups are of the
same size. Therefore
ωi = ω =
1
n
. (3)
The controller earns αp from the State for the monitoring level p and
s/he encounters increasing difficulty in monitoring entrepreneurs as the
number of ethnic groups grows. The optimal monitoring level p will be
derived endogenously in the model and it will be a non linear function of
ethnolinguistic fractionalization n. In the rest of the paper, we refer to the
entrepreneur payoff by a superscript (E) and to the bureaucrat payoff by a
superscript (B).
Our model can be formalized by introducing the following three-period
dynamic game:
(1) At stage one of the game, the entrepreneur should decide in which
technology to invest, i.e. whether to invest her/his capital in the
modern or in the traditional technology. Such a decision is tantamount
to the decision of whether or not to submit the project to the Public
Administration, considering that a concession is needed to invest in
the modern technology. Project submission does not result in the
automatic issue of the concession by the bureaucrat, in that the
bureaucrat may refuse to grant the concession unless a bribe bd is
paid.
13This prejudice is reinforced by the nationalist attitude of a population. Corneo (2010)
stresses in his theoretical and empirical analysis that ability is an explanatory factor of
nationalism: in fact, parents of low-ability children instill nationalism in their offspring
which will have, therefore, more hostile relations with immigrants.
14It is worth noticing that the controllers do not have information about the bureaucrat’s
ethnic group before the check. In fact, we do not deal with political corruption but
bureaucratic corruption (petty corruption). In this case, the controller does not know
which entrepreneurs to control until a superior tells her/him the assigned tasks and s/he
cannot refuse to control the entrepreneurs which have been allocated.
15Notice that our model does not apply if ethnic fractionalization is not reflected also
in institutions, as it is often the case in dictatorships.
16This assumption we make allows us to derive closed form formulas for the analysis of
the growth rate and the reputation of the entrepreneurs with respect to fractionalization
and the probability of being detected. We can only say that whenever the ethnic group i is
dominant then, ceteris paribus, the probability qi to be detected is lower and corruption is
greater. In the case of non homogeneous ethnic groups, our model should be interpreted
as a normative model highlighting the impact of electoral and administrative systems
where ethnic representation in government and/or civil servants is proportional to the
demographic base.
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(1.1) If the entrepreneur decides not to submit the project (investing
in the traditional technology) the game ends and then the payoff
vector for bureaucrat and entrepreneur is:
pi1 = (pi
(B)
1 , pi
(E)
1 ) = (w, aTk). (4)
(1.2) If the entrepreneur decides to submit the project, s/he asks
the bureaucrat to issue the concession. In this case, the game
continues to stage two.
(2) At stage two, the bureaucrat decides the amount to ask for as a bribe
bd for issuing the concession.
(2.1) If the bureaucrat, facing an entrepreneur who has submitted
a project, decides not to ask for a bribe (bd = 0) for issuing
the concession, then the game ends and the payoff vector for
bureaucrat and entrepreneur is:
pi2 = (pi
(B)
2 , pi
(E)
2 ) = (w, aMk). (5)
(2.2) If the bureaucrat decides to negotiate the payment of a bribe
(bd > 0) with the entrepreneur in order to obtain the concession,
the game continues to stage three.
(3) At stage three, the payoffs will depend on whether, on one hand, the
agreement between the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur is achieved
or not and, on the other hand, on whether the bureaucrat and the
entrepreneur are reported (with probability qi) or not.
(3.1) If agreement is not reached, the payoffs will depend on whether
the bureaucrat is reported (with probability qi) or not. If the
bureaucrat is detected, then she/he is punished, therefore s/he
receives her/his salary minus a finemk. The entrepreneur obtains
the concession and can thus invest in the modern technology.
Otherwise, the bureaucrat receives her/his wage and refuses to
grant the concession to the entrepreneur who must invest in the
traditional technology. Therefore, the game ends with a payoff
vector which is random, in that it depends on the probability of
being reported:{
(w −mk, aMk), with probability qi;
(w, aTk), with probability 1− qi. (6)
The expected payoff vector is:
pi3 = (pi
(B)
4 , pi
(E)
4 ) = (w − qimk, qiaMk + (1− qi)aTk) . (7)
Then the game ends.
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(3.2) If agreement is not reached, the payoffs will depend on
whether the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur are reported (with
probability qi) or not. If they are detected, then the bureaucrat
receives her/his salary minus the fine mk and the entrepreneur
pays the reputation cost cj , but she/he is refunded the cost of the
bribe paid to the bureaucrat. Otherwise, the bureaucrat receives
her/his wage plus the bribe, which the entrepreneur must pay.
Therefore, the game ends with a payoff vector which is random,
in that it depends on the probability of being reported:{
(w −mk, aMk − cjk), with probability qi;
(w + bNB, aMk − bNB), with probability 1− qi. (8)
The expected payoff vector is:
pi4 = (pi
(B)
4 , pi
(E)
4 ) =
(
w + (1− qi)bNB −mkqi, aMk − (1− qi)bNB − qicjk
)
.
(9)
When a controller monitors a corrupt transaction, s/he decides to bring a
charge only if the bureaucrat belongs to a different ethnic group from that of
the controller. The probability of a controller, belonging to the i-th ethnic
group, meeting a bureaucrat belonging to the i-th ethnic group as well, will
be equal to 1n . Then qi is the probability of the bureaucrat belonging to
the i-th ethnic group being reported and it derives from the probability p
of being monitored and from the probability of the controller belonging to
an ethnic group different from i. Then
qi = q = p
(
1− 1
n
)
, ∀ i = 1, . . . , n. (10)
The optimum level of p derives from maximization by the controller of
her/his own expected payoff (see section 4).
3 The solution of the game
The game may be solved by backward induction, starting from the last
stage. The bribe resulting as the Nash solution to a bargaining game in
the last subgame needs to be determined. Such a bribe is the outcome of
a negotiation between the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur, who will be
assumed to share a given surplus on an equal basis. We first determine the
equilibrium bribe (see Appendix B for the proof).
Proposition 3.1. Let q 6= 1.17 Then there exists a unique non-negative
bribe bNBj , as the Nash solution to a bargaining game, given by:
bNBj =
[
(aM − aT )k
2
− qcjk
2(1− q)
]
. (11)
17If q = 1 this stage of the game is never reached.
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Proposition 3.1 shows that, when the equilibrium is reached, the
entrepreneur gives half of the surplus to the bureaucrat, such a surplus
being the difference in the expected return on the investment in the two
different technologies (modern and traditional), net of the entrepreneur’s
expected costs for being detected in a corrupt transaction.
Remark 3.2. We notice that a straightforward computation gives that
the equilibrium bribe bNBj is decreasing with respect to the probability of
being detected in a corrupted transaction. Therefore, increasing q, reduces
the potential surplus that the bureaucrat and entrepreneur can share, thus
reducing the bribe.
3.1 The static equilibrium
The game has been solved in Appendix C by using the backward induction
method starting from its last stage. The solution of the game is formalized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3. Let 0 ≤ (aM−aT )(1−q)q − 2m = c◦ ≤ 118.
(a) If cj ∈ [0, c◦) then the equilibrium expected payoff vector is:
pi4 =
(
w −mkq + (aM − aT )(1− q)k
2
− cjkq
2
, aMk − (aM − aT )(1− q)k2 −
cjkq
2
)
.
(12)
This is the expected payoff vector connected to equilibrium C (see
below);
(b) if cj ∈ [c◦, 1] then the equilibrium expected payoff vector is:
pi2 = (w, aMk) . (13)
This is the expected payoff vector connected to equilibrium NC (see
below).
The previous proposition shows that we obtain two perfect Nash equilibria
in the sub-games, depending on the parameter values:
• Equilibrium C: if cj < c◦, the difference in gross profits between the
modern sector and the traditional technology is such as to make up
for the expected cost of corruption. Thus, the surplus to be shared
between the entrepreneur and the bureaucrat will keep a negotiation
going, the outcome of which is the bribe corresponding to the Nash
solution to a bargaining game;
18Actually, this requirement allows us to avoid the trivial cases of corner solutions: when
c◦ < 0, then the entrepreneurs are honest, while c◦ > 1 implies that the entrepreneurs are
corrupt.
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• Equilibrium NC: if cj ≥ c◦, i.e. the “reputation cost” is so high that
the entrepreneur would turn down a request for a bribe. Realizing this
fact, the bureaucrat will refrain from asking for a bribe for issuing the
concession. Thus the entrepreneur will choose the modern technology
and will not be asked for a bribe by the bureaucrat.
Substantially, there are two ranges of cj which correspond to different
corruption levels: in equilibrium C corruption is widespread, while it is
absent in equilibrium NC.
As we have stated, our model assumes that reputation costs may vary
across different entrepreneurs (cj for the j-th entrepreneur), depending on
her/his own “reputation loss” when the corrupt transaction is detected. This
argument applies to each ethnic group.
The distribution of individual costs is described through a probability
distribution function F (cj), where j is the specific entrepreneur. This
function represents the fraction of entrepreneurs who agree to be corrupted.
By definition, F is a distribution function associated to a random variable
whose density function f has support [0, 1]. The shape of the function f
gives good information about the general level of entrepreneurs’ honesty. In
particular, the symmetry properties of the function f provide information
about the distribution of the entrepreneurs between those with a high or
low reputation costs, in short the honest and the corrupt. If f is a centered
symmetric function, then the country has an average level of corruption,
and the number of corrupted entrepreneurs balances the number of honest
entrepreneurs. The case of f asymmetric to the left can be associated to a
country where most entrepreneurs are corrupt, while f is asymmetric to the
right in countries where most entrepreneurs are honest. Therefore, so that
our analysis is complete, we need to provide a random law for the reputation
costs which may describe the generality of the cases, depending on the value
of some parameters. This purpose can be achieved by incurring the cost of
adopting an unusual probability law, which is commonly used in a rather
mathematical context: namely the Kumaraswamy distribution. In fact, of
all the distribution functions of random variables with support in [0, 1], the
Kumaraswamy law seems to be the more appropriate choice for F , since it
has some features that make it suitable for modeling the different reputation
costs of the entrepreneurs belonging to a given country19. However, as we
will see below in Remark 3.4, the results concerning the behavior of the
aggregate expected growth rate with respect to the monitoring level q can
be obtained, regardless of the particular shape of cost distribution.
Given the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs, their behavior will be influenced
19Further details of the mathematical definition of the Kumarawamy law with some
graphical examples, together with some supporting arguments on why we use this random
variable for modelling the reputation costs distribution, are provided in Appendix D.
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by their own reputation cost cj . In this hypothesis we have
F (c◦) = 1−(1−(c◦)α1)α2 = 1−
(
1−
(
(aM − aT )(1− q)
q
− 2m
)α1)α2
(14)
is the fraction of entrepreneurs belonging to the i-th ethnic group with a
reputation cost cj < c◦, while
1− F (c◦) = (1− (c◦)α1)α2 =
(
1−
(
(aM − aT )(1− q)
q
− 2m
)α1)α2
(15)
is the fraction of entrepreneurs belonging to the i-th ethnic group with a
reputation cost cj ≥ c◦.
In contrast with the static case, in a dynamic context, as we will see
in the next section, corruption influences the accumulation of capital by
entrepreneurs, and thus economic growth.
3.2 Dynamic equilibrium
The game perspective is now expanded to review the dynamic consequences
of corruption on growth and, therefore, on investment, while analyzing the
entrepreneur’s behavior in this respect. As noted, a manufactured product
may be either consumed C or invested
•
k.
We consider a constant elasticity utility function:
U =
C1−σ − 1
1− σ . (16)
Each entrepreneur maximizes utility over an infinite period of time subject
to a budget constraint. This problem is formalized as:
max
C∈[0,+∞)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU(C)dt (17)
subject to
•
k = ΠE − C, (18)
where C is consumption, e−ρ is the uniperiodal discount factor and ΠE is
the return on the investment for the entrepreneur.
Since ΠE is different across equilibria, the problem is solved for the two
cases20.
This model predicts that the j-th entrepreneur belonging to the i-th ethnic
group will have only one optimum equilibrium -and only one corresponding
expected growth rate- depending on her/his own reputation cost.
20In the interest of clarity, we report the computation of the expected growth rate in
Appendix E.
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• The entrepreneur with a reputation cost cj ≤ c◦, will find it worthwhile
to be corrupted and then the optimal equilibrium will be C. In this
equilibrium, the entrepreneur will obtain a consumption expected
growth rate equal to:
γCj =
1
σ
[
aM − (aM − aT )(1− q)2 −
qcj
2
− ρ
]
. (19)
• The entrepreneur with a reputation cost cj > c◦, will find it worthwhile
to be honest and then, the optimal equilibrium will be NC. In this
equilibrium, the entrepreneur will obtain a constant consumption
growth rate equal to:
γNC =
1
σ
[aM − ρ]. (20)
Furthermore, it can easily be demonstrated that capital and income also
have the same expected growth rate21.
Then, at aggregate level, we obtain an income expected growth rate
γ weighting over different expected growth rates for corresponding
entrepreneurs. Then, in the equilibrium C, there will be F (c◦) corrupted
entrepreneurs, each with her/his own expected growth rate γCj ; in the
equilibrium NC there will be [1 − F (c◦)] honest entrepreneurs, all with
the same growth rate γNC . At the aggregate level, we have:
γ =
1
σ
· [1− (1− (c◦)α1)α2 ] ·
[
aM − (aM − aT )(1− q)2 − ρ
]
−
− 1
2σ
[
q
∫ c◦
0
cdc
]
+
1
σ
· [1− (c◦)α1 ]α2 (aM − ρ) =
=
(aM − aT )(1− q)
2σ
·[1−(c◦)α1 ]α2− q
4σ
·(c◦)2+1
σ
·
[
aM − (aM − aT )(1− q)2 − ρ
]
.
(21)
By substituting c◦ = (aM−aT )(1−q)q − 2m into (21), we obtain the economy
expected growth rate as
γ =
(aM − aT )(1− q)
2σ
·
[
1−
(
(aM − aT )(1− q)
q
− 2m
)α1]α2
−
− q
4σ
·
(
(aM − aT )(1− q)
q
− 2m
)2
+
1
σ
·
[
aM − (aM − aT )(1− q)2 − ρ
]
. (22)
A straightforward computation gives that
∂γ
∂q
> 0. (23)
21See Appendix F for the proof.
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This means that the expected growth rate of the economy increases as the
probability of being reported grows.
Remark 3.4. Relation in (23) holds, for each chosen probability distribution
describing the cost function. Indeed, for a generic cumulative function F ,
we can write:
γ =
1
σ
·
{
1− F
(
(aM − aT )(1− q)
q
− 2m
)
· (aM − aT )(1− q)
2
−
− q
4σ
·
[(
(aM − aT )(1− q)
q
− 2m
)2
+ aM − (aM − aT )(1− q)2 − ρ
]}
,
(24)
and also in this case γ increases with respect to q, since F increases by
definition.
Despite the argument laid out in Remark 3.4, we prefer to show a very
general but specific density function which applies to a multitude of cases,
in order to avoid results that can be difficult to interpret. In this respect,
the next section contains an explanation of how the relationship between
the expected growth rate and the monitoring level works, by considering an
endogenous optimal monitoring level.
4 Endogenous monitoring
As we have stated, q is the probability of being reported and it derives from
the probability p of being monitored and from the probability 1−1/n of the
bureaucrat belonging to a different ethnic group from that of the controller
(see formula (10)).
So far, we have taken the monitoring level p as exogenous, but now we make
the analysis more realistic, considering that the monitoring level set by the
controller results from maximization of her/his payoff Vp:
Vp = αp− χ(n, p). (25)
where αp are the benefits of a certain monitoring level p for the controller
and χ(n, p) are monitoring costs, dependent on n and p.
The optimum level of p, named p∗, is derived by maximization of the
controller’s expected payoff function in (25).
The controller decides the optimal level of monitoring p∗ comparing the
marginal benefit of a certain monitoring level with the cost of doing it.
We state some assumptions about the cost function: costs are assumed
to be null in the case of absence of monitoring, as it naturally should be.
Moreover, we assume that the marginal costs increase as the monitoring level
increases. In fact, comprehensive monitoring activity implies increased costs,
14
since it requires a more sophisticated action and the specialist knowledge
about complex corrupted transactions. As a further requirement, we
hypothesize that the costs related to a fixed monitoring level grows as ethnic
fractionalization n increases. This assumption is driven by the growing
complexity for any given group of interacting with a larger number of ethnic
groups, also considering the evident presence of linguistic difficulties of
monitoring members of different ethnic groups22. Wrong (2009), describing
the “artificial” increase in ethnic groups which was forced onto Kenya by
colonialism, makes a forceful supporting argument:
“by 1938, Kenya had been partitioned into twenty-four overcrowded native
reserves “Kamba” for the Kamba people, “Kikuyu” for the Kikuyu, and so
on and the fertile “White Highlands” for exclusive European use, where
Africans could not own land. [...] The settlers wanted Africans to act
small, think local. It made them so more manageable. [...] To those on the
reserves, who increasingly viewed their communities as mini-nations in fierce
competition with one another, Kenyans from outside were “foreigners”.
“Most of us on the farm rarely met people from other communities, spoke
their language or participated in their cultural practices”[the future Nobel
Peace Prize-winner Wanri Maathai remarked].”.
The necessity of summing up the above statements and remarks drives the
choice of an appropriate cost function. In this respect, we achieve our target
by introducing the mathematical concept of Orlicz functions23. In doing
so, we incur the cost of a rather complicated mathematical tool, but we
also admit that it is worth incurring this cost. Indeed, the constitutive
elements of the concept of Orlicz functions are so general and basic that
Orlicz functions may be suitable for modeling purposes. In this respect, as
we will see below, an Orlicz function describes well the main features of the
monitoring costs.24
The costs χ are defined as:
χ(n, p) = g(n)M(p), (26)
where:
• g : N → [0,+∞) describes how the monitoring level cost depends
on the number of ethnic groups. We point out that, in our analysis,
22See, e.g., Ortega and T˚angeras (2008).
23For the concept of Orlicz functions and kernels see Appendix G, where some illustrative
examples are also provided.
24It is worth noting that we are not the pioneers of the use of special functions like
those of Orlicz type for economic modeling purposes, even if this technique is rather
recent. In this respect, we refer to Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit (2008) and Boucekkine
et al. (2008) where it is shown that the solution to a two-sector Lucas-Uzawa model
of endogenous growth can be expressed in terms of hypergeometric-type function. In
Benchekroun and Withagen (2010), the exponential integrals are applied for modeling an
economy with resource constraints.
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the trivial case of a single ethnic group is not considered, and the
population is made up of at least two different ethnic groups. We can
assume that we know the value of g in the case of two different ethnic
groups, with value g(2) = g2 > 0. Function g is also assumed to be
increasing;
• M has support in [0, 1], M([0, 1]) ≡ [0, H¯], H¯ > 0 and M is a
truncation of an Orlicz function as follows:
M(x) := 1{x∈[0,1]} · Γ(x),
where 1A is the usual characteristic function of the set A and Γ(x) is
an Orlicz function such that Γ(1) ≡ M(1) = H¯. We assume that the
kernel function of Γ, named h, is strictly increasing.
The concept of Orlicz function is not new in the economic literature. In
this respect, it is well-known that the properties of this mathematical tool
are suitable to characterize a class of risk measures used in actuarial science
(Haezendock and Goovaerts, 1982; Schmidt, 1989; Goovaerts et al., 2004;
Bellini and Rosazza Gianin, 2008). As already stressed in the discussion
developed above, we feel that the Orlicz functions can be also used to
describe well the cost functions introduced in our model, with a particular
focus on the relationship between monitoring level and fractionalization.
In our framework, the highest monitoring level is attained for m = 1. In
this case the cost function is:
χ(n, 1) = g(n)H¯,
and it depends on the ethnic fractionalization within the country in that it
depends on the term g(n).
The function Vp of the monitoring activity, for the controller, is maximized
for an optimal monitoring level p∗, which can be found by imposing the first
order condition:
∂Vp
∂p
= α− g(n)h(p∗) = 0.
Since h is strictly increasing, then there exists the inverse function h−1. We
assume hereafter the following condition for the weights g(n).
g(n) ≥ α
h(1)
, ∀n ∈ N. (27)
Condition (27) states that the cost adjustment factor g(n) is not less than
a certain threshold depending on the monitoring costs and the marginal
benefit of monitoring.
By imposing (27), we can find the optimal monitoring level p∗ ∈ [0, 1] given
by:
p∗ = h−1
(
α
g(n)
)
. (28)
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By considering the continuous version of the function g : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞),
assuming that g is differentiable and replacing the discrete variable n with
the continuous variable x, we can compute the first derivative of p∗,
(p∗)′(x) =
1
h′(α/g(x))
· −αg
′(x)
g2(x)
< 0, (29)
since g is increasing respect to n.
Thus, the assumption that g is increasing implies that the optimal
monitoring level decreases as the number of ethnic groups grows. This is due
to the fact that the monitoring costs grow as the number of ethnic groups
increases.
By substituting the optimal p∗ of (28) into (10), we find the optimal
probability of being reported q∗:
q∗ = h−1
(
α
g(n)
)
·
(
1− 1
n
)
. (30)
Then the optimal probability of being reported q∗ depends on ethnolinguistic
fractionalization through two channels:
(1) the optimal monitoring level: as ethnic diversity increases, we have
shown that the monitoring cost also increases and thus the optimal
monitoring level p∗ declines;
(2) the probability of the bureaucrat belonging to a different ethnic group
from that of the controller: as the number of ethnic groups increases,
the probability of the bureaucrat belonging to the same ethnic group
decreases. Therefore the probability of the bureaucrat belonging to a
different ethnic group from that of the controller increases.
More intuitively, on the one hand, as ethnic diversity increases, the
monitoring cost increases and then the optimal monitoring level decreases,
thus the optimal q∗ decreases. On the other hand, as ethnic diversity
increases, the probability of the bureaucrat belonging to a different ethnic
group from that of the controller increases. Uniting these two opposite
channels we will show (see Theorem 4.1.) that, subject to a non restrictive
assumption regarding g, there is a threshold value of ethnic diversity n∗
where the probability of being reported reaches a maximum. For lower
fractionalization levels, i.e. before n∗, the probability of being reported
q∗ increases with respect to ethnic diversity n. Indeed, the increase in
the probability of being reported -due to the fact that the bureaucrat
belongs to a different ethnic group from that of the controller- overtakes
the reduction in monitoring level -due to the increasing monitoring cost-.
For high fractionalization levels, i.e. after n∗, the growing monitoring costs
overtake the increase in the probability of being reported.
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These results are reflected in the aggregate expected growth rate. We define
by γ∗ the expected growth rate computed at the optimal monitoring level
p∗ (and so at the optimal level q∗) by substituting (30) and (28) into (21)
as follows:
γ∗ =
(aM − aT )(1− q∗)
2σ
·
[
1−
(
(aM − aT )(1− q∗)
q∗
− 2m
)α1]α2
−
− q
∗
4σ
·
(
(aM − aT )(1− q∗)
q∗
− 2m
)2
+
1
σ
·
[
aM − (aM − aT )(1− q
∗)
2
− ρ
]
.
(31)
We measure the corruption level with the fraction of corrupted
entrepreneurs, given by (14). By substituting (30) into (14), we have:
F (c◦)∗ = 1−
(
1−
(
(aM − aT )(1− q∗)
q∗
− 2m
)α1)α2
. (32)
This formula shows that, before n∗, as ethnic diversity increases, corruption
-via the increasing probability of being reported q∗- decreases; conversely,
after n∗ as ethnic diversity increases, corruption also increases, due to the
decreasing probability of being reported q∗.
In the next result, the previous arguments are formalized:
Theorem 4.1. Consider a function g such that
g(n∗) =
α
h
(
Kn∗
n∗−1
) , (33)
for n∗ ∈ N, with
K = h−1(α/g2). (34)
Moreover, suppose that 
h′′
(
α
g(n∗)
)
< 0;
g′′(n∗)
g′(n∗) >
2g′(n∗)
g(n∗) .
(35)
Then n∗ is the unique absolute maximum point for q∗ and for γ∗, and it is
the unique absolute minimum point for (c◦).
For the proof see Appendix H.
Remark 4.2. The hypotheses contained in (35) are rather general: the first
one is implied by the concavity of h, while the second one can be interpreted
as a condition on the risk-aversion, whenever g is assumed to be an utility
function. In this respect, it is worth recalling that the ratio −g′′/g′ is the
Arrow-Pratt risk-aversion coefficient of the utility function g.
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In Theorem 4.1, we showed that ethnolinguistic diversity increases the
monitoring activity level, up to a critical ethnolinguistic threshold n∗. In this
case, the expected growth rate increases and the corruption level declines.
For high fractionalization levels, i.e. after n∗, the growing monitoring costs
reduce the monitoring level and thus economic growth.
Moreover, the dynamic analysis shows an inverted U-curve between
ethnolinguistic fractionalization and the expected growth rate. Indeed,
we showed that, in the case of very fragmented countries or, conversely,
in a homogeneous society, the economy has a low expected growth rate
and widespread corruption, while in intermediate fragmented countries, the
economy has a high expected growth rate and limited corruption.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we have analyzed the influence of cultural and ethnic factors
on the spread of corruption. The theoretical and empirical literature
has stressed how greater ethnolinguistic fractionalization can produce
greater corruption; in our model, as a further result, we have shown that
intermediate ethnolinguistic fractionalization makes the control system more
incisive on the bureaucrat’s behavior, and thus might reduce corruption.
A theoretical game model is presented, in order to explore the relationship
between ethnolinguistic fractionalization, corruption and the growth rate.
Very general conditions on the model’s parameters are assumed. In
particular, we state that the reputation costs follow a Kumaraswamy
distribution, which belongs to the family of two-parameter distribution but,
differently from the Beta law, it is explicitly tractable from a mathematical
point of view.
We find an ethnolinguistic threshold n∗ such that before n∗ the expected
growth rate grows and the corruption level declines. For higher
fractionalization levels, i.e. after n∗, the growing monitoring costs drive
growing corruption and a low economic growth and monitoring level.
The dynamic analysis shows a U-curve
between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and the expected growth rate: in
the case of a highly fractionalized society or, conversely, in a homogeneous
society, the economy has a low expected growth rate, while in the middle of
the range of ethnic diversity, the economy has a high expected growth rate
and limited corruption.
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A Appendix
World Countries are:
Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina;
Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Bangladesh; Barbados;
Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Benin; Bermuda; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and
Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Brunei; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi;
Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Cape Verde; Central African Republic;
Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Congo,
Republic of; Costa Rica; Cote d‘Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech
Republic; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador;
Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji;
Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia, The Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece;
Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras;
Hong Kong; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland;
Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kiribati;
Korea, Republic of; Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Laos; Latria; Lebanon; Lesotho;
Liberia; Libya; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macao; Macedonia; Madagascar;
Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Malta; Marshall Islands; Mauritania; Mauritius;
Mexico; Micronesia, Fed. Sts.; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique;
Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria;
Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru;
Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Sao Tome
and Principe; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Singapore;
Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Solomon Islands; Somalia; South Africa; Spain;
Sri Lanka; St. Kitts & Nevis; Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Sweden;
Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Tonga;
Trinidad; Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United
Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan;
Vanuatu; Venezuela; Vietnam; Zambia; Zimbabwe.
Democratic countries, considering the indications of Freedom House
(http://www.democracyweb.org/new-map/), are:
Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Australia; Austria; Bahamas; Barbados;
Belgium; Belize; Benin; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Canada; Cape Verde;
Chile; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Domenica;
Dominican Republic; El Salvador; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany;
Ghana; Greece; Grenada; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Ireland;
Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Kiribati; Latria; Lithuania; Luxembourg;
Mali; Malta; Marshall Islands; Mauritius; Mexico; Micronesia, Fed. Sts.;
Mongolia; Namibia; Netherlands, New Zealand; Norway; Panama; Peru;
Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain;
Suriname; Sweden; Switzerland; Taiwan; Trinidad & Tobago; Ukraine;
United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Vanuatu.
OECD Countries are:
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Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic; Denmark, Finland;
France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan;
Korea; Luxembourg; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland;
Portugal; Slovak Republic; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; United
Kingdom; United States.
B Appendix
Let pi∆ = pi4 − pi3 = (pi(E)∆ , pi(B)∆ ) be the vector of the differences in the
expected payoffs where pi4 is the agreement about the bribe and where
pi3 is disagreement between bureaucrat and entrepreneur. The bribe bNB
associated to the Nash solution to a bargaining game is the solution of the
following maximum problem
max
b∈(0,+∞)
(pi(E)∆ · pi(B)∆ ),
i.e.
max
b∈(0,+∞)
{[aMk − (1− q)b− qcjk − qaMk − aTk(1− q)] · [w −mkq + (1− q)b− w +mkq]} ,
that is the maximum of the product between the elements of pi∆ and where
[qaMk+(1− q)aTk,w−mkq] is the point of disagreement, i.e. the expected
payoffs that the entrepreneur and the bureaucrat respectively would obtain
if they did not come to an agreement. Since the objective function is concave
with respect to b, a sufficient condition for b being a maximum is the first
order condition
∂
(
pi
(E)
∆ · pi(B)∆
)
∂b
= 0,
that leads in this case to:
(aM − aT )k(1− q)2 − cjq(1− q)k − 2b(1− q)2 = 0⇔
⇔ 2b(1− q)2 = (aM − aT )k(1− q)2 − cjq(1− q)k,
bringing to:
bNB =
[
(aM − aT )k
2
− cjkq
2(1− q)
]
(36)
that is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame, ∀q 6= 1.
C Appendix
The static game is solved with the backward induction method. Starting
from stage 3, the entrepreneur needs to decide whether to negotiate with
the bureaucrat. Both expected payoffs are then compared, because the
bureaucrat asked for a bribe.
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(3) At stage three the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe if and only if
pi
(E)
4 > pi
(E)
3 ⇔ aMk − (1− q)bNB − cjkq > qaMk + (1− q)aTk (37)
i.e. the entrepreneur expected payoff negotiated is greater than
her/his expected payoff in the case of refusal. Since under a perfect
information hypothesis, the entrepreneur knows the final equilibrium
bribe bNB then we substitute this value in the previous inequality and,
by simplification, we obtain
aMk − (aM − aT )(1− q)k2 −
cjkq
2
> qaMk + (1− q)aTk,
that is equivalent to:
(aM − aT )(1− q)k
2
− cjkq
2
> 0 (38)
that is verified ∀ cj < (aM−aT )(1−q)q = c?.
Notice that in order to have an admissible probability set, cj must
belong to [0, 1]. Since aM > aT , then we have
c? =
(aM − aT )(1− q)
q
≥ 0. (39)
Generally, if cj < c? the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe, while if
cj ≥ c? s/he refuses the bribe.
(2) Going up the decision-making tree, at stage two, the bureaucrat
decides whether to ask for a bribe.
• If cj ≥ c? then the bureaucrat knows that the entrepreneur will not
accept any bribe. Therefore, s/he will be honest and s/he will pursue
the concession without any bribe: indeed the bureaucrat expected
payoff if not asking for a bribe w is greater than her/his expected
payoff if s/he asks for a bribe w −mkq.
• If cj < c? then the bureaucrat knows that if s/he asks for a bribe
then the entrepreneur will enter into negotiation and the final bribe
will be bNB. Then at stage two the bureaucrat asks for a bribe if and
only if
pi
(B)
4 > pi
(B)
2 ⇔ w −mkq + (1− q)bNB > w
i.e. the bureaucrat expected payoff if asking for a bribe is greater
than her/his expected payoff if s/he does not ask for a bribe. By
substituting bNB in the previous inequality and after some algebra,
we obtain
cj < c
◦ =
(aM − aT )(1− q)
q
− 2m.
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Because c◦ < c?, so we can conclude that if cj < c◦ then the bureaucrat
asks for the bribe bNB and the entrepreneur accepts. If, cj ≥ c◦, the
bureaucrat will not find it worthwhile to ask for a bribe.
(1) At stage one the entrepreneur has to decide whether to submit the
project.
• If cj ≥ c◦ then the entrepreneur knows that if s/he submits a project
no bribe will be asked for. So s/he will submit the project if and only
if
pi
(E)
2 > pi
(E)
1 ⇔ aM < aT
The previous inequality is always verified by hypothesis.
• If cj < c◦ then the entrepreneur knows that the bureaucrat will ask
for the bribe bNB which s/he will accept. So, at stage one, s/he has
to decide whether to invest in the modern technology. S/he will invest
in the modern technology if and only if
pi
(E)
1 < pi
(E)
4 ⇔ aMk −
(aM − aT )(1− q)k
2
− kqcj
2
> aTk,
hence:
cj < c
?? =
(aM − aT )(1 + q)
q
. (40)
Because c?? > c? > c◦, so we can conclude that if cj < c◦ the
entrepreneur invests in the modern technology with corruption, while
if cj ≥ c◦ the entrepreneur invests in the modern technology without
corruption.
D Appendix
The Kumaraswamy law belongs to the family of the two-parameters
distributions, being the Beta distribution the most famous. A very
important feature of the Kumaraswamy random variable is its mathematical
tractability, since an explicit form of its distribution function is available.
Indeed, given α1, α2 ∈ (0,+∞), the density function f and the distribution
function F of a Kumaraswamy random variable are, respectively:
f(c) = α1α2cα1−1(1− cα1)α2−1, c ∈ [0, 1]; (41)
F (c) = 1− (1− cα1)α2 , c ∈ [0, 1]. (42)
To be more exhaustive, the graphs of the Kumaraswamy density and
distribution functions related to some choices of α1 and α2 are shown in
Figures 2 and 3. As the Figures show, the shape of the Kumaraswamy
density function changes as the values of α1 and α2 vary. Therefore, this
probability law is suitable for describing different types of ethical behaviors
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of entrepreneurs.
More specifically, if 1 < α2 < α1, then the shape of the distribution function
is asymmetric to the right, describing entrepreneurs with high reputation
costs. Conversely, when 1 < α1 < α2, then we have asymmetry to the left,
and the entrepreneurs have low reputation costs. If α1 = α2 = 1, then the
Kumaraswamy distribution reduces to the uniform distribution25.
E Appendix
In the equilibrium with corruption (equilibrium C), the expected
entrepreneur’s profit is:
ΠCE = k
[
aM − (aM − aT )(1− q)2 −
cjq
2
]
, (43)
thus the constraint is:
•
k = k
[
aM − (aM − aT )(1− q)2 −
cjq
2
]
− C. (44)
The Hamiltonian function H(C, k, λ) is:
H = e−ρt
C1−σ − 1
1− σ + λ
[
k
(
aM − (aM − aT )(1− q)2 −
cjq
2
)
− C
]
, (45)
where λ is a costate variable. Optimization provides the following first-order
conditions:
∂H(C, k, λ)
∂C
= e−ρtC−σ − λ = 0, (46)
and
−∂H(C, k, λ)
∂λ
=
•
λ ⇐⇒ −λ
[
aM − (aM − aT )(1− q)2 −
cjq
2
]
=
•
λ . (47)
By deriving the first condition, the expected consumption growth rate is
obtained:
γCj =
1
σ
[
aM − (aM − aT )(1− q)2 −
cjq
2
− ρ
]
. (48)
In equilibrium NC, the entrepreneur’s profit is:
ΠNCE = aMk, (49)
thus the constraint is: •
k = aMk − C. (50)
25We stress that the distinction provided above on the reputation costs of the
entrepreneurs has to be viewed as a particular feature of the Kuramaswamy distribution,
that explains the relevance of this random variable for modeling purposes. As we have
shown in Remark 3.4, the analysis disregards the particular shape of function F .
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The Hamiltonian function H(C, k, λ) is:
H = e−ρt
C1−σ − 1
1− σ + λ[aMk − C]. (51)
A straightforward computation gives the following expression for the
constant consumption growth rate:
γNC =
1
σ
[aM − ρ]. (52)
F Appendix
At a steady state, everything grows at the same rate and therefore
•
k
k is
constant. At equilibrium C we know that
•
k
k
= aM − (aM − aT )(1− q)2 −
cjq
2
− C
k
.
Since
•
k
k is constant, then the difference between both terms on the right
should also be constant, and because aM , aT , c and q are constant, then C
and k should grow at the same rate. Similarly, since y = aMk, at a steady
state income grows at the same rate as capital. The same applies in the case
of equilibrium NC.
G Appendix
M : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞) is an Orlicz function if and only if it is continuous,
convex and nondecreasing in [0,+∞), M(0) = 0, M(x) > 0 for x > 0
and lim
x→+∞M(x) = +∞. Krasnoselskii and Rutitsky (1961) proved a
representation theorem, stating that given an Orlicz functionM , there exists
a function h : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞) such that
M(x) =
∫ x
0
h(t)dt, (53)
where h(t) is right-differentiable for t ≥ 0, h(0) = 0, h(t) > 0 for t > 0, h is
nondecreasing and lim
t→+∞h(t) = +∞. h is known as the kernel of the Orlicz
function M . In our model, the analysis is restricted to the case of h strictly
increasing.
We now list some noticeable examples of Orlicz functions M together with
the related kernel h. The derivation of the kernel is obtained by applying
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formula (53).
M(x) = x2, with h(x) = 2x;
M(x) = axk with h(x) = akxk−1, a > 0 and k > 1;
M(x) = x2ex with h(x) = x(x+ 2)ex;
M(x) = xαeβx with h(x) = (αxα−1 + βxα)eβx, α > 1 and β > 0.
(54)
As examples in (54) show, the set of Orlicz function is rather wide, and
contains some types of polynomials as well as exponentials.
H Appendix
Define the function q∗ : [2,+∞)→ R such that
q∗(x) = h−1
(
α
g(x)
)
·
(
1− 1
x
)
. (55)
The first order condition is
(q∗)′(x) =
1
h′(α/g(x))
· −αg
′(x)
g2(x)
·
(
1− 1
x
)
+ h−1
(
α
g(x)
)
· 1
x2
= 0.
Then
1
h′(α/g(x))
· 1
h−1(α/g(x))
· −αg
′(x)
g2(x)
=
1
x(1− x) .
By integrating, we obtain
log(h−1(α/g(x)))− log(h−1(α/g(2))) = log
(
x
x− 1
)
, x ≥ 2. (56)
A straightforward computation allows us to rewrite (56) as follows:
h−1(α/g(x)) =
Kx
x− 1 , (57)
where K = h−1(α/g(2)). By (57) we have that:
∃(q∗)′(x∗) = 0⇐⇒ g(x∗) = α
h
(
Kx∗
x∗−1
) .
The second order conditions can be written as follows:
(q∗)′′(x) =
2
x2
· d
dx
(
h−1
(
α
g(x)
))
−
− 2
x3
h−1
(
α
g(x)
)
+
x− 1
x
· d
2
dx2
(
h−1
(
α
g(x)
))
. (58)
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By (58), we get that a sufficient condition for (q∗)′′(x) < 0 is that
d2
dx2
(
h−1
(
α
g(x)
))
< 0. (59)
By conditions in (35) and after some algebra, we obtain that condition (59)
holds.
Returning to the discrete variable n and imposing the boundary condition
g(2) = g2, we have that g(n∗) can be written as in (33), with K given by
(34) and
n∗ ∈ {[x∗], [x∗] + 1} | q(n∗) = max{q([x∗]), q([x∗] + 1)}.
n∗ is the unique absolute maximum point for q∗.
The optimal expected growth rate γ∗ can be written as γ∗(n) := γ(q∗(n)).
Directly by formula (31), we observe that a straightforward computation
gives that γ∗ has the same behavior as q∗, i.e. it has a unique maximum
point in n∗ as well.
The costs at the optimal monitoring level m∗ are:
(c◦)∗(n) =
(aM − aT )(1− q∗(n))
q∗(n)
− 2m.
Therefore
((c◦)∗)′(n) = −(aM − aT )
(q∗)2(n)
· (q∗)′(n). (60)
The coefficient of (q∗)′(n) in (60) is negative, and so n∗ is the unique
minimum point for (c◦)∗.
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